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Larry Lewis' comments
on Foreknowledge
vs. Free Will
M. ARDELL

choose to do otherwise than you do, rather free will
indicates that you caused the actions rather than
someone else.
Incompatiblists will argue that free will is not compatible
with determinism. Incompatiblists may believe in free
will or in determinism, but not both.

The behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner is an example of a believer in determinism. He argued that within
the core of our genetic makeup we carry the seeds which
will determine all future reactions to our environment
(Skinner, 1971). Hence, if the environment of an individual (including physical laws and the actions of others) could be perfectly understood, the individual's
actions could be predicted with complete accuracy. Thus
B. F. Skinner could arguably be called a fatalist and an
incompatiblist.
John Calvin, the theologian, is another example of a
believer in determinism, in that God is one of the prior
causes that determines events (Weber, 1980). He argued
that within the core of our God-created being, we carry
the seeds which will determine all future reactions to
our environment. He further argued that because of
God's exhaustive definitive foreknowledge, one's choices
lead one toward an inevitable future which is certainly
known by God. John Calvin could arguably be called a
fatalist and an incompatiblist (Halsall, 1998).
Elder Neal A. Maxwell's statements appear to support soft-determinism. LDS doctrine uniquely offers a
premise for soft-determinism in that it states the
essential core of our being was not "created" by God but
always existed (D&C 93:29, Abr. 3:21-22). Therefore,
within that core we may very well carry the seeds
which will determine all future reactions. Elder
Maxwell obviously believes in agency (i.e., power and
choice) and responsibility for one's choices. He does
not necessarily accept the definition of free will as
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o address these comments, it is important to first
establish a common vocabulary. By doing so, some
of the apparent disagreements may thus be resolved.
Some definitions used in the field of philosophy relate
to the discussion:
The position of God having exhaustive definite foreknowledge allows that God sees what we regard as the
future in complete detail, so there is no future action
or outcome that can happen different from that
which God knows will happen (whether he sees
it in the present or future according to his frame
of reference).
+ The position of having limited foreknowledge allows that
God predicts the future in superb detail, though it is
possible for him to be surprised as events unfold, and
thus to learn.
+ Determinism (sometimes called hard-determinism) is the
doctrine that everything that happens is entirely determined by prior causes.
+ Free will is the position that one's choices are not determined by prior causes nor by divine intervention.
+ Fatalism is the doctrine that events are fixed in advance
so that human beings are powerless to change them.
+ Soft-determinism is the doctrine that free will is compatible with determinism. Soft-determinists, or compatibilists, argue that free will is not the freedom to
+

EDITOltS NOTE: by mistake, the following was left out of M.
Ardell Broadbent's "Fatalism and Free Will" article published in volume 25 (2000): M. Ardell Broadbent is a graduate of Brigham Young

University. This study received IRB approval from BYU The author thanks
Diane Spangler PhD of the BYU Psychology Department for helpful comments on the manuscript and assistance both in suggesting the instntment used
for statistical analysis and in interpreting the results. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: M. Ardell Broadbent, email:
ardelLbroadbent@hotmail.com
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defined above, because this definition eschews prior
causes (such as the essential core of our eternal being)
which may determine our choices. Thus he could
arguably be termed a compatiblist.
Elder B. H. Roberts argued (Roberts, 1903) that God
is omniscient, but that omniscience is the ability to
know at a particular time all that is possible to know at
that time (presupposing that God exists within time).
He argued that some things about the future are impossible to know. Thus God would be omniscient yet not
have absolute definite exact foreknowledge.
These four represent separate interpretations, though
the first three by definition compromise the definition
of free will to some extent. Nevertheless, only the interpretations attributed to Elder Maxwell and Elder
Roberts are consistent with LOS doctrine
Considering the doctrine of free will, which is also
consistent with LOS doctrine, William Hasker (2002)
argues that exhaustive definite foreknowledge and free
will as defined above are incompatible. [See also the logical proof (from Potter, 2001) presented below.] To one
who believes in God's exhaustive definite foreknowledge,
soft-determinism differs only from hard-determinism in
that one's free choices lead toward the inevitable future
that is certainly and specifically known by God. If God
has absolute definite foreknowledge, then he not only
knows what we will do, but he knows that we will do it
freely. Moreover, he knows exactly each detail that leads
up to every event. These facts make it impossible to actually have free will in the defined sense that we can choose
anything other than our destined choices.
Philosophers of religion disagree on whether or not
God has such absolute exhaustive definite foreknowledge.
They also disagree on whether or not exhaustive definite
foreknowledge is compatible with free wilL Brother Lewis'
first objection is valid in that the article (Broadbent, 2000)
did not acknowledge sufficiently that the latter point is a
matter of contention among philosophers. However the
article did state that it would not focus on logical proofs
from a philosophical perspective but would instead examine scripture and statements by LOS authorities.
The author finds the statements of Brigham Young,
Truman Madsen, James E. Talmage, and B. H. Roberts
more compelling and consistent with the whole of scriptural statements on the topic. These authorities, as seen
by the quotes included in the article (Broadbent, 2000, p.
20), support the view that God does not have exhaustive

definite foreknowledge. It is assumed that the quoted
authorities on both sides of the argument were not necessarily intending their statements on this topic to be
seen as direct revelation. Indeed, the Encyclopedia of
Mormonism (Ludlow, 1992) states that there is no official
Mormon belief regarding God's foreknowledge; one may
believe either way and be in line with LOS doctrine:
Anyone seeking to understand divine foreknowledge must
begin by recognizing that scripture does not directly
address the question as it has been formulated in philosophy and theology, where the emphasis is on the content
and logic of knowledge. The scriptures are explicit that
God knows all and that we can trust him. They have not
been explicit about what that means philosophically or
theologically. Consequently, short of new revelation, any
answer to the theological question of God's foreknowledge
can be only speculative. (Faulconer, 1992, p. 521)
The article (Broadbent, 2000) was written more for the
benefit of those who agree with Hasker (2002), whether
they have thought deeply on the subject or not. In my
experience, those who promote this view are often disparaged by other church members. The conclusions of the
study are based on the premise that for church members
who believe with Hasker that God's omniscience is
incompatible with free will - that they may preserve a
sense of free will by defining omniscience different from
it being exhaustive definite foreknowledge. But even those
who disagree with Hasker may still support this article's
purpose, which is to promote belief in free will, whether
it is arrived at by one logical explanation or another.
According to Hasker's (2002) view, belief in both
exhaustive definite foreknowledge and free will at the
same time constitutes cognitive dissonance. This is discussed in the article within the section titled "Fatalism as
a Logical Corollary of Unlimited Omniscience" (also see
the Logical Proof presented below). Hyrum Smith's
statement, "I would not serve a God that had not all wisdom and power" (cited in McConkie, 1954) seems to be
in line with exhaustive definite foreknowledge. Although
Hyrum Smith may not have originally intended it to be
so, this article has interpreted it as such.
Turning toward a slightly different topic, Brother Lewis
asked about the meaning of the statement, 'Clients could
then be free to develop a solution which seems logical and
consistent with their beliefs" (Broadbent, 2000, p. 21). Note
54
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scriptures emphasize God's unchanging nature, the
emphasis is that God will always be God and that the
"rules" will not change - that God is not fickle nor will he
be persuaded to bend from a course which is just and perfect. Elder Bruce R. McConkie (1966) stated that God's
nature is not changing over time, even if there is change
over time in other areas of his experience. But, if areas of
his experience do change, this would imply that God is
within time, since non-temporal things cannot by definition change - change requires a "before" and an "after:'
This author agrees with Brother Lewis' statement that "if
two church leaders each seem to concentrate on one aspect
of doctrine at the apparent expense of another aspect, it
doesn't mean that one of those leaders is right and the other
wrong, or that no one really understands:' The article
(Broadbent, 2000) makes this point on page 22, quoting
President Brigham Young's concept of'spheres of influence"
- which he used to explain how from our perspective and in
relation to our sphere of experience God has all knowledge,
though in another sphere he still increases in knowledge.
Regarding the reference to the excerpt from Journal of
Discourses 6:291, Dennis Potter (of the Utah Valley State
College philosophy faculty) has pointed out:

that this statement was not intended to suggest, as Brother
Lewis postulates, that "clients who want to should ignore
church teachings and make it up as they go:' Not at alL The
statement was intended to mean only that we must discern
between prophetic statements and non-doctrinal Mormon
ideology. The author's intent is to promote a tolerance of
varied opinion on this sensitive topic, a tolerance that has at
times been lacking. Members who agree with Hasker may
not be aware that they are not out of line with LDS doctrine. This article seeks to promote that awareness.
This author does not doubt that God has a perfect
memory. In agreement with Brother Lewis, there is
indeed no logic in blaming one's future choices on God
because of a belief that he perfectly foresees every choice.
And it is true, as Brother Lewis points out, that "to say
that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with free will is
not to say that God is responsible for our actions:' There
is no statement to the contrary in the article. This author
does sympathize with those who believe that because of
God's exhaustive definite foreknowledge, one's free choices lead one toward the inevitable future that is certainty
known by God. For some, this issue not easily resolved.
Sorenson's (1982), Smith's (1988) and Robson's concerns
(1983, 1989), quoted in the article, present complex and
pressing questions which certainly deserve a respectful
answer. Their questioning does not necessarily constitute
a lack in thinking ability nor maladaptive behavior.
In an effort to be concise, the article included section
headers intended to alert readers to a change in subject,
such as the transition to the topic of whether God is
"inside" or"outside" time. It was hoped that the connection
of this specific topic with the main topic would be clear
and not in need of elaboration. Specifically, the topic of
God's relation to time directly relates to whether "all
things are present ... as things placed before him" (Halsall,
1998), as suggested by John Calvin, which is often
explained by interpreting God as being outside time - or
whether God exists in time as suggested by Abraham
5:13, which would imply that temporal limits are imposed
on God, or that he is constrained to work within such
limits. Some LDS leaders have said God experiences time
from moment to moment, though his moments may be
significantly quantitatively different from ours.
Further, it is not necessarily a contradiction to say that
eternal progression denotes an unavoidable progressive
change over time despite the fact that God is the same
yesterday, today, and forever (2 Ne. 27:23). When the

Brigham Young was talking about foreordination and not
foreknowledge. They are two different things. Foreordination
merely says that God has given us some callings before this
life. We might or might not fulfill them. This is perfectly
compatible with the view that God does not specifically
know whether or not we will fulfill our callings. Brigham
Young clearly denied foreknowledge. Joseph F. Smith clearly affirmed it. They cannot both be right. (Potter, 2001)
This article (Broadbent, 2000) was certainly not
intended to promote the idea that people are not accountable for their choices, or to detract from anyone's faith in
or reverence for God's divinity. But there is no evidence
that belief in a God who does not possess absolute unlimited foreknowledge is spiritually or psychologically detrimentaL This author believes that the truth can be comprehended, and that it is indeed taught by the Church.
LOGICAL PROOF

The following is a philosophical argument (Potter,
2001) to the effect that God's absolute definite foreknowledge and free will are incompatible. If God knows at time
55
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T that event X will occur at T +n, then at time T it must
already be true that X will occur at T +n. Bur if X is the
supposed result of a free action on the part of some agent
A and if A is supposed to be free with respect to X at T,
then it must still be possible at T that X not occur.
However, if it is true at T that X will occur at T +n, then
it is no longer possible at T that X not occur at T +n. So,
if God knows at T that X will occur at T +n, then A is not
free at T with respect to X's occurrence at T +n.
The doctrine of Divine Providence: everything that happens is according to God's plan, it was meant to happen
all along. This doesn't mean that God causes everything
to happen; God can intend certain things to happen
without directly causing them, by knowing the precise
nature of every aspect of his creations and being able to
predict exactly what will occur.
This entails that God knows everything that will happen
before it will happen. For example, God knows the precise
time and date of your eventual death. This is referred to as
Absolute Foreknowledge. It is important to distinguish Absolure
Foreknowledge from the claim that God knows everything
that can possibly happen. The latter does not entail that God
necessarily knows which possibility will become actual.
---

Second, Divine Providence claims that God takes his
foreknowledge and makes a plan for each and every event
in the history of the world. He knows what can happen, he
knows what he wants to happen, and so he plans it to happen that way. This is referred to as Divine Correlation.
Third, Divine Providence also states that whatever will
happen does happen according to God's plan. It is God's will
and plan, for example, that you choose to visit the washroom
precisely when you do. There is no deviation from God's
plan. This is referred to as Divine Governance. These are not
entirely separate claims; they are intertwined. They emphasize different aspects of the doctrine of Divine Providence.
The doctrine of Free Will states that with respect to
some things that we do, we have a choice ( i.e. it is possible for us to choose otherwise than we do).
The doctrine of Prophecy states that God uses his
knowledge of what will happen to inform us through
prophets what will happen with the idea of changing
what we will do. And the doctrine of Petitionary Prayer is
that our prayers can make a difference.
These doctrines of Free Will, Prophecy and of
Petitionary Prayer are inconsistent with Divine
Providence (Potter, 2001).

--------------
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